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Bracton De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae. Edited by George E. Wood-
bine. Volume Two. With a Preface by the Editor. New Haven, Yale
University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press,
1922. pp. xi, 449.
The first volume of this work appeared in 1915. It comprise'd the apparatus
of the Editor and was of minute learning and consummate mastery of the many
manuscripts. It gave the learned world its first adequate knowledge of what
the manuscripts of Bracton really contain, with the relations between the manu-
scripts. Now after seven yedrs comes this first half of Bracton's Latin text with
the almost incalculable labor of the various readings at the bottoms of the
pages.
The general plan of the work is to devote the first volume to the manu-
scripts, then two volumes to the Latin text alone, and two volumes to the
translation. The usual plan followed by the Selden Society and by the Rolls
edition of Bracton is to'put text and translation on opposite pages. But Bracton
without a translation is useless and with a translation the great mass of
readers will not consult the Latin, and it is much better to have the transla-
tion more usable by placing it in separate volumes, although Mr. Woodbine
doubtless would say, as Bracton says as to his own arrangement; that it is
sine praejudicio inelioris sententiae.
A law book that has been awaited through hundreds of years is entitled to
something more than perfunctory notice and we shall not apologize for the
length of this review. Bracton's Su-nina deserves the adjectives which he
applies to donatio in the law, it is inagna, celebris, et fanvosa All 
things
considered, Bracton's book is the greatest achievement in the history of English
law. Written roughly between 124o and 126o, with additions later by the author,
it would have been at any prior time impossible. It was made in a great age,
a time of great rulers, great soldiers, great statesmen, writers, and historians.
It was especially a great age in the law. But there was then no English
language, only three barbarous dialects, where even a hundred years later "the
Mercii that beeth men of myddel Englande understondeth betre the syde
longages Northeron and Southeron than Northern and Southern understondeth
oyther other." All court proceedings were in Latin, but the speech of all
people of the better classes, was Anglo-French, described a few years later as
"le plus bel et le plus gracious language, et plus noble parler, aprs latin
d' escole, qui soit au monde."
This Anglo-French was within fifty years wholly to supersede Latin for all
legal purposes except the court roll. This explains why Bracton, although
the treatise was reproduced in many manuscripts and although many lawyers
had copies, was translated and shortened into Britton's law French, when law-
yers had become so ignorant as to think that Bracton's statement as to 
the
Roman actio de fa-,ilia herciscunda (partition of an inheritance) was an 
action
concerning the estate of the Lady of Hertiscombe who had lands' in Devon-
shire. For three hundred years Bracton was forgotten.
In the great expansion of the human spirit in the Renaissance, lawyers bene-
fited probably most of all, and justices like Catline and Saunders (vide Plowden
passim) resuscitated Bracton. Richard Tottell, the prince of law publishers,
caused T. N. (otherwise unknown) to print the manuscript In 1569 the
handsome folio, in specially cut, clear Roman type, not the black letter beloved
of lawyers, appeared, a wonderful piece of work for the time. T. N. tells
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the reader his difficulties with his "exemplariz" (MSS.) which, he says, were
often the work of men unlearned and ignorant of Latin and in a barbarous
age, and not without difficulty and expense too, the book had been gotten out
"with the assistance of many good men, some of them illustrious and most
highly honored," who freely loaned their libros (MSS.). We would give much
to know what those manuscripts were and who were the men who assisted.
One must have been that fine lawyer Roger Manwood, Lord Chief Baron,
who discourses so splendidly in Moore's Reports (not yet translated) and who
gave a Bracton manuscript to his son.
Almost a century passed and again an edition of Bracton, smaller and cheaper,
was demanded for public consumption in i64o, when the words of Bracton
were grimly cited for rectifying the King's misrule, when the royal head rolled
from the block. At the beginning of the next century the learned Holt in
Coggs v. Bernard (17o) 2 Ld. Rayd. gog, to the wonder of his stupid puisnes,
vouched Bracton to show the Roman law of bailment to be a part of the law
of England. Sir William Jones in his treatise on Bailments even restored a
lost line in Bracton to account for Bracton's confusion between mutnum, bail-
ment for use and consumption, and commodatum, bailment for use. But if
a man today were to attempt to classify under the Roman heads, a loan of stock
for settlement day or a so-called lease of a flock of sheep, he would probably
find that Bracton's mistake properly stated the English law. In Gaines v.
Hennzen (i86o, U. S.) 24 How. 553, and in Cope v. Cope (1891) 137 U. S. 682,
ii Sup. Ct. 222, Bracton could properly have been cited on the law as to
adulterine bastards. Even today the rule that good will of a business or
brands upon goods can be conveyed only as an appurtenant to property can
be traced in ascendente linea to Bracton's rule that an advowson can be conveyed
only with the land or a part thereof. The reasons given fbr the present rule
are as foolish as Blackstone's reason for wager of law in the action of detinue.
A curious misuse of Bracton can be found in U. S. v. Lee (1882) io6 U. S.
i96, 228, 1 Sup. Ct. 24o, 267, in Judge Gray's dissenting opinion. Not less
curious is it to know that the true philosophy of law, of its source and of its
reasons for existence, after wandering for so many centuries in the wilder-
ness of Bodin, Hobbes, Althusius, Kant, Hegel, and Austin-that true theory
which has lately been so well shown in Krabbe's Modern Theory of the State-
can nowhere he found stated so thoroughly, as in the opening chapters of Bracton
and nowhere so well illustrated, as in that development of law prior to the legisla-
tion of Edward I, which Bracton so fully understood.
The reign of Blackstone, whose smug optimism is a contrast to Bracton,
completely obscured Bracton for many years, until Reeves' History of English
Law brought him again to the light. At length Sir Travers Twiss for the
Rolls series got out an edition marked by every possible fault, where the text,
through pure laziness, is an affront, and the translation, through ignorance,
is an atrocity. A man, who thinks Bracton's legittima exceptio (a plea in abate-
ment or a special plea in bar) is a "legal demurrer" and so translates it, when
in fact such a demurrer was unheard of for centuries after Bracton, is irre-
deemably hopeless. After this travesty on Bracton, a fortunate discovery of
the manuscript of Bracton's collection of cases for his treatise, published as
Bracton s Note Book by the lamented Maitland, and Pollock and Maitland's
History of English Laz 'prior to Edward I, based almost wholly on Bracton,
restored him to his true place.
Maitland, in his Introduction to Bractoies Note Book, dwelt upon the
necessity for a proper examination of the Bracton manuscripts, and said
many true things as to what a proper edition of Bracton would require.- After
all these years it is astonishing to find'that the one task of supreme importance
in the history of English law, should be financed by private munificence and
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be undertaken by an adequate scholar in our own country. Mr. Woodbine's
first volume showed that he had the industry and perseverance for the infinite
drudgery, the meticulous care as to minute detail, which we have hitherto
ascribed to the dogged patience of the German scholars. We cannot be mis-
taken in thinking that here is another instance of those coming of late to show
that the aegis of legal scholarship will gradually be shifted to this, our native
land.
Something should now be said as to Bracton, the man, whom we see by
self-revealing touches here and there in his work to be animated by a true love
of justice and of his fellow-men, merciful, honest, just, humane. The terrors
of the orthodox hell which Bracton invokes against all judges who judge
unjustly were a vivid thing to him. When the stirrings of that great age
spurred him to the task of stating the English law, the stoutest heart might
well have been appalled at its magnitude. Scattered through the great accumu-
lation of court rolls, whose examination could not be finished in a lifetime,
the difficulty was where to start wifh the law. Whatever had been 
accepted
by the commune sponsione of the realm was the law. No lex scripturn, no
enactments, no corpus furis existed, but only quod usus comprobavit. 
But
these customary laws, asserts Bracton, were being drawn into abuse 
at the
command of greater men, by judges who, assailed by doubts and 
varying
opinions, were deciding according to their own unrestrained discretion 
rather
than by the authority of the laws. "Therefore I, Henry de Bracton, 
for the
purpose of informing the great mass of lesser men, have devoted 
my mind
ad vetera judicia justorum (proof positive that he then had 
made up his
collection of old cases of those eminently just and great judges, Pateshull 
and
Raleigh) and by diligent and thorough scrutiny of their rulings, 
conclusions,
and decisions, not without labor by day and toil by night (for 
he, while his
companions slept, was toiling upward in the night) have reduced what 
I found
worthy of note to a compendious compilation to be held in perpetual 
memory."
Thus Bracton became one of the immortals and true it has been 
of him that
"The light he leaves behind him lies
Upon the paths of men."I
It must be apparent that Bracton had a marvelous memory and 
a mind
capacious of retaining legal rules. But as a part of his preparation 
he first
obtained leave to withdraw the many-year-old rolls of Pateshull 
and Raleigh.
He went over them case by case and then put into the hands of 
copyists the
marked passages that he desired excerpted. These excerpts put 
together now
constitute the manuscript which formed a collection of precedents. 
But such a
collection could give him no general theory of jurisprudence or 
a genetral
classification. This he had to find in the only place it could 
be found-the
Roman law and the toil of hundreds of enlightened lawyers. From 
over the
Alps at Bologna was streaming the light of Irnerius and Azo. 
Accursius was
just about finishing his Great Gloss, but Bracton never saw it nor 
had he seen
anything in that line but Azo. It is capable of demonstration from 
internal
evidence that Bracton had nothing but Azo's book until after 
he had been
working a long time. He never saw the Institutes. His reference 
to that part
of the Corpus Juris is clearly a quotation from Azo. It is also 
capable of
demonstration from internal evidence that Bracton began with 
a full plan of his
book, as Mr. Woodbine shows in his first volume, and wrote 
steadily through
from part to part. It is also capable of demonstration that 
during the writing,
he obtained a copy of the Roman Code and a part of the 
Roman Digest.
Singularly enough the industry of Mr. Borris Komar in the Illinois 
Law R'view
has found the list of Bracton's books left to the chapter at Exeter. 
He had a
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Code; he had what is called the Digestum Vetus; he had a copy of the Authent-
cum, Justinian's Latin version of the Novels, but it is easily inferable from Brac-
ton's chapters on succession that he never read the Novels to the one hundred and
eighteenth, which would have shown him the original of the English law.
His Digest was only the Vetus, which is so called because there was first brought
from Ravenna to Bologna the first part, almost twenty-four books, of the
Digest, which was called Vetus. Then was brought the latter part, called
Novum, and the intervening part, called Infortiatum, was last brought. Brac-
ton had only the Vetus, and that later in life.
A comparison of three passages in Bracton, not one of them an addition,
will show the gradual growth of his thought. In his early chapter (folio 5b)
he says that the King has no equal or superior and hence if wrong he doeth,
there is no earthly power to correct him but he must await the judgment of
God, who has said, "vengeance is mine, I will repay." But later he says (folio
34) the King may do evil and his justices will fall into the judgment of the
living God. The King has a superior, the law, which is his bridle, and his
court of earls and barons, the great council of the whole realm, can and ought
to bridle him, if he slips his bridle. But by the time Bracton has written
to folio 1O7, he has done much reading. He now knows from his Digestum
Vetus (I, 4, I) that the King's power comes from the people, he has read
St. Isidore's Etymologies on the word King and he says that a King is such
only so long as he rules justly. He has read the Code and the great Digna
Vox (I, 4, 4), he has read the comments of the Italian doctors thereon show-
ing the King to be bound by the laws, and now he writes the indignant passage,
bitterly arraigning the misrule of the King. We can readily deduce how
Bracton wrote his book, how he began only with his Azo for general theory,
but it was enough. He perhaps knew the saying "Chi nois ha Azzo, non vada
a palazzo," and "what is not in the gloss, is not in the law."
After Bracton had finished his book so far as it goes, perhaps while he was
writing, he made additions to his text in various places. These additions in
some manuscripts have become mingled with notes by others, and the task
of the editor is firmly to reject what is not Bracton, and at the same time
to be absolutely sure that he rejects nothing of Bracton's own. Mr. Wood-
bine has shown the great differences in manuscripts and the mistake of Mait-
land is classing the Digby manuscript as the most reliable. In the years
of work to come, he can show the errors in Pollock and Maitland's History,
which arise from mistaking Bracton's meaning. Here we are concerned
with the restored purity of the Bracton text. Mr. Woodbine goes upon the
manuscripts. The noted places, for instance, of the clause on what property
is common, he leaves as Bracton wrote it, and of the clause as to mutumn
and commodatuin he leaves the text as Bracton, we think knowingly, desired
it to stand. Bracton was too keen and discriminating to make an error that
a schoolboy could correct.
The results of Mr. Woodbine's careful work are marvelous. The instances
are so many in this volume that mention in detail is impossible. In one case
of unusual care as to an addicio which will come in the next volume, we believe
that a careful consideration of circumstances will show the weight of manu-
script authority to be correct. On folio 422b Mr. Woodbine deduces that a
part of an addicio, "ut de W. Lungesper" (as in the case of W. Lungesp~e)
is not by Bracton. (See i Woodbine, 421.) When the passage is looked at the
internal evidence shows that the addicio is by Bracton except those words.
He was speaking of the exceptio (plea in abatement, although any distinction
between abatement and bar was then unknown), that a defendant was
a minor. He had stated that this exception does not lie when the claim is
in right of the King, and had cited the case de Wilehno de Lungespey and
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Elen his wife. William Lungespey (Longsword) was the redoubtable war-
rior, bastard son of Henry II and perhaps the Fair Rosamond (rosa mundi
non rosa munda, as the punning epitaph has it). In 1198 in the reign of his
half brother, Richard the Lion Hearted, Longsword had married Ela
(Isabella not Elena as Bracton thinks), in her own right Countess of Salisbury
as heiress of William, Earl of Salisbury. She was then twelve years old,
and this case must have been in Richard's or John's reign and is too early
for the Note Book. The case involved the question whether the great strong-
hold, the castle of Salisbury and its estate and the Earldom of Salisbury, had
reverted to the King as chief lord. The minority of Ela was pleaded but dis-
allowed. An inquisition was made and the King held the castle, but it after-
wards, with the dignity, held on the same tenure, went back to Ela. Her
husband, in jure uxoris, was Earl of Salisbury. Bracton then goes on to cite
other instances where the exception of minority does not prevail. Afterwards
he added an addicio and in it said that an inquisition can be had without
prejudice to the minor, as to the extent of the minor's estate, whether in fee
or for life or for a term, etc., and some other person, seeing the case as to
William Longsword and Ela his wife and the case on the next page as to the
younger William Longsword and Idonea -his wife, added "as in the case of W.
Lungesper," which does not decide that point, nor would Bracton have so
cited it. Mr. Woodbine says: "This passage has certainly come from Bracton;
but the reference to W. Lungesper must be rejected."
On folio 28 is an addicio showing an important point of law as to a donatio
by a minor in fraud of creditors, donees, or purchasers, which is rejected by
the manuscript authority, and from internal evidence alone is not Bracton's.
Mr. Woodbine conservatively says that it "can hardly be accepted as Bracton's"
(vol. I, P. 377). Such passages have misled writers as to Bracton's law and
are the best illustration of the necessity for establishing the text. We shall
now speak of a few matters in detail.
On folios 41 and 41b is an addicio as to which in the multitude of details
there must be some mistake. Mr. Woodbine (vol. I, p. 379) says'that 
the
addicio is to be divided at the words "attornatus fuerit" into two parts. 
This
is certainly an error. The addicio cannot be so divided, for the place is in the
middle of a sentence. But this error is not carried into the actual text. 
The
addicio is shown (vol. 2, p. 128) as not so divided. We agree with Mr. 
Wood-
bine in thinking the passage is not by Bracton, but from internal evidence.
What seems to have happened is that Bracton wrote an addicio (2 Woodbine,
129) after the two lines of poetry on page i28. This addicio is clearly 
by
Bracton, as Mr. Woodbine says. Then some one wrote the long 
confused
addicio on the margin and it in copying was put in the wrong place, 
just before
a true addicio by Bracton. Bracton never wrote such Latin as is found 
in the
addicio on page 128.
Sometimes, however,' in reliance on manuscripts, addiciones seem to be printed
in the wrong place. As to the place of addiciones, manuscripts will 
be of
little value to fix the exact place. Thus on page 56 (folio 13b) is a 
passage
certainly by Bracton, for the word "tutor" alone shows it, where 
Bracton is
stating the rule that a donatia can be made to a minor if it be for his advantage,
but nothing can be taken from the minor by any act done by 
or for him.
The addicio belongs on folio i4b, where minors are being mentioned 
in con-
nection with the validity of a donation. It has no connection where 
it is put.
So also the addicio in Woodbine, page 1IO, vol. 2, as to homage belongs 
on
page io8 at the end of the paragraph as to a donatio for homage and 
service
or without homage. It seems plain that addicciones will often be in 
the wrong
place in the manuscripts.
In passing we may note Bracton's definition of duress stated after a 
case
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of that noted swashbuckler Faulks de Breaut4. Bracton says (folio 16b):
"I must now state what duress is. It is mental trepidation caused by
present fear or peril to come, and we ought to have fear actually present,
not the anticipation of danger to be incurred, nor that of a foolish and timid
man, but such as can overcome a resolute man. The fear ought to be such
as contains within itself peril of death or bodily injury," etc. Now there
is no doubt that this is pure English law as it is yet law, but Azo on the Code
(2, 28) states the law just this way. It is plain that such law comes only
from the Roman law and no other source. Practically it could be shown,
we think, that almost all the substantive law laid down by English courts as
it was in Bracton's time, came from the Roman law. The passage shows,
however, that Bracton had not the Code but Azo, when he wrote the passage.
The addicio on folio 17b, i, is another good instance and the law stated as
to election of remedies has a strong Roman tinge and is clearly the same as
Azo's text.
On page 68, vol. 2, of Woodbine is an instance of something properly added
out of the manuscripts to the text as an addicio, which is in no former text.
On page 320, vol. 2, of Woodbine, which is on folio 113, is a reference to
the Digest as to the lex Julia on public violence, which seems to shiow that
Bracton had more than the Vetus, but a careful examination may show whether
Bracton found it in Azo or perhaps in the Canon law. The learned addiciones
on folios 114 and ii4b show that Bracton now certainly had his Digestum
Vetus.
With the exception of the Abbess of Barking's Rodknights, a socage tenure
probably dating frdm before the Conquest, which shows the picturesque detail
of the Knight-riders who are required, by their tenure to ride in attendance
upon the Abbess, we reach nothing to indicate a large English population until
the treatise on Pleas of the Crowt. There, in Woodbine, vol. 2, page 328, we
find the Anglo-Saxon word "banw," meaning the slayer, masquerading as a
French feminine noun, "la bane." It is our word bane in its old meaning. I
do not think Bracton wrote the words.
On page 418 of this volume, the long addicio which contains the law of
Athelstane, the reference to the laws of Romans, Franks, and English, and
the story from a French chronicle belongs, it seems, as the old text gives it,
at the end of the chapter on rape. On page 346 we find the English "hond-
habbende and bacherende," which looks unintelligible enough. It refers to a
thief captured with the stolen property .as a matter of private jurisdiction,
along with sac and soc, toll and team, infangethefe and utfangethefe. It would
have been just as well to correct "bacherende" to bacberende, as it is printed
on page 425 and 436, or it may be a misprint. The phrase Bracton gives as
equivalent to "seisatus de latrocinio," or seized of the thing stolen. What
the words actually are, as we have them today, is "handhaving and back-
bearing," or, as was later said, "taken with the mainour," or, in our present
slang, which is about on a par with the Anglo-Saxon, "pinched with the goods
on him." On page 447 (folio 159) is a reference to a case which shows
Bracton working on his book as late as 1263. He died probably in 1268.
Generally in regard to the text and the addiciones it may be said that Mr.
Woodbine exercises a conservative judgment. The marking of them, as in this
book, is absolutely necessary, but he has made very sure that nothing that
Bracton. wrote has been left out of this text. Of the text itself the best
judge is Mr. Woodbine himself and he has given anyone, who thinks he can
do better, full materials in the variorum readings. This text is final and
definitive. It can be changed only by the discovery of Bracton's own actual
manuscript and that is so improbable as not to be a possible hypothesis.
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The purpose of this review does not justify any examination of interesting
questions outside the text.
We know that the second volume of text will be as sound work as this first
one. Then will come the corona operis, the translation with its notes relating
Bracton to the succeeding development. It will no doubt appear that this
clarum et venerabile nonen is the fons furLs of English law. First, however,
must be settled the many points as to the law in his own day. We believe 
that
the greater part not only of the law of actions but of the substantive 
law of
England in Bracton's day came from the Roman law in the two hundred 
years
prior to Bracton. The work that has been done in the last years will greatly
assist this task and when it has been done, a splendid achievement well 
worth
the labor of a lifetime will have been accomplished.
In conclusion it remains to be said that typographically these volumes are
a pleasure to the sight. The words in precisely the proper type stand 
forth
from the pages of dead white paper with clarity and distinctness. The 
outward
garb of the great classic is perfect. American lawyers ought to feel 
elated
that these volumes and their successors will indicate what efficient work 
is being
done in this country for the history of English law. The bard consoled 
the
vanquished British Queen with the words:
"Regions Caesar never knew,
Thy posterity shall sway;
Where his eagles never flew,
None invincible as they."
Certainly as to English law this prediction was true, and Pateshull, Raleigh,
and Bracton were certifying laws for mighty realms, of which they, 
much less
the Caesars, had never dreamed. Mr. Woodbine, who works upon the great 
history
of English law, is working for still wider regions where this law by its innate
excellence will come to rule.
JoHN M. ZANE.
Chicago, Illinois.
The League of Nations. By Sir Frederick. Pollock. Second Edition. London,
Stevens & Sons, 1922. pp. xvi, 266.
Historians, lawyers, and the general reader will all be grateful for this sug-
gestive and succinct sketch, now in its second edition, which ought to be in the
hands of every politician, and which, properly read, would dispel the mists of
sentimentality and cynicism that have clouded the debates on the League. Sir
Frederick has drawn upon his wealth of erudition to provide an admirable back-
ground for his exposition of the principles of the Covenant; his analytical powers
are displayed brilliantly in his discussion of the functions of the League; and
there is a healthy idealism not bereft of practical sense, which illumines his
calm but very effective plea for the establishment of order in international affairs.
He has divided the work into two parts, each of four chapters, the first 
intro-
ductory to the organization of the League; the second dealing with its functions
and actual operation. The book concludes with an appendix of sixty pages, which
includes pertinent documents. Admirable bibliographical references are placed
at the head of 
each chapter.
The introductory portion begins with a brief sketch of the older European system
regarded from the international point of view. It covers arbitration in the Middle
Ages, mediaeval plans for a general federation, the Congress of Vienna system,
its development into the Concert of Europe, and its dissolution in i9og, when,
the author believes, the annexation of Bosnia by Austria dealt it a final 
blow.
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The two succeeding chapters deal with arbitration in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries and the Hague Tribunal. The author emphasizes the distinction, not
alvays in the mind of the reader without legal training, between mediation and
arbitration. He then goes on to deal with the value of international arbitration,
a passage in which his judicial qualities receive full opportunity; the excess of
praise and abuse which the method of arbitration has evoked, he pitilessly con-
demns. Beginning with the Alabama case and utilizing other examples, he does
not stint his praise for the system as one method of securing international peace.
But his chapter on the Hague Tribunal makes plain that he fully appreciates the
imperfect nature of transitory jurisdiction, and that the demand for some sort
of permanent court, frequently advanced by United States delegates, had his
sympathy. The final chapter of the introductory portion of the work is largely
historical, dealing with the movements aroused by the war, the American, British,
and continental societies formed to organize a league of nations, and especially
the Smuts pamphlet. The chapter ends with an impressive catalogue of interna-
tional conventions already in force in 1914, for the regulation of communications,
administration of treaty provisions, collection of statistics and intelligence, and
many other cosmopolitan purposes.
The three succeeding chapters analyze the Covenant. The first of these deals
with the chief organs of the League, the Assembly, Cuncil, and Secretariat
Sir Frederick evidently agrees with the contention that the Covenant is not the
constitution of a super-state, for he quotes, without criticism, the official declara-
tion that it is a "solemn agreement between sovereign states which consent to
limit their complete freedom of action on certain points for the greater good of
themselves and the world at large." There is such a strong reminiscence of
Rousseau in this declaration that the reader will regret that Sir Frederick does
not stop to discuss its validity. One wishes that he had directed his analytical
powers towards framing a distinction between theso-called "super-state" and
the organization that results from the Covenant. He is satisfied, however, merely
to explain the structure of the League, with full comments upon the functions of
its different organs.
In chapters six and seven the author explains the operation of these organs
under the threat or in time of war. In the former he takes up the question of
armament, the plans for its reduction, the problem of private manufacture, and
the exchange of information. Article X Js analyzed with the conclusion that its
guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of the member statescan-
not be construed into an attempt to create a new Holy Alliance. In the following
chapter there is an illuminating discussion of judicial processes and sanctions.
Beginning with the provision for the settlement of disputes through arbitral award
or for inquiry by the Council, the author goes on to explain the constitution of the
Permanent Court, the cases in which non-justiciable disputes may be settled by
the Council, and the power of the Council to refer to the Assembly. He concludes
with a discussion of the sanctions against war or breach of the Covenant, and the
proceedings to be taken with regard to non-member states.
The final chapter, entitled "The League in Peace," is a brief statement of the
non-political activities of the League, which in view of the loss of political influ-
ence occasioned by the abstention of the United States, are doubtless its most signi-
ficant product. The final pages of this chapter, however, show plainly that even
from the political point of view, the League has been far from "dead."
The book is perhaps the clearest and fairest analysis of the Covenant thus far
published. The bias of the author in favor of giving the fullest opportunity to
the League is apparent, and yet he is careful always to understate the conclusions
which he draws from his analysis when they seem to confirm that bias. Without
appearing to argue he has produced the strongest argument in favor of the League
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that has appeared since the little-read speeches of President Wilson delivered in
the fall of 1919. That this argument has resulted from the intellectual processes
of so great a mind as that of Sir Frederick Pollock is a matter of some significance.
CHARLES SEYMOUR.
Yale University.
The Nature and Sources of the Law. By John Chipman Gray. Second Edition.
By Roland Gray. New York, The MacMillan Co., 1921. pp. xviii, 348.
This is more nearly a reprinting than a revision. The revisor tells us in his
preface that prior to the distinguished author's death in 1915 he had made notes
for a second edition, of which the revisor, his son, has made use. But the result-
ing additions to the book are trifling. We are told that the criticisms of the
original edition, and subsequent writings on the same subject, had not caused the
author to modify his views. In fact there is practically nothing in this edition to
indicate that Professor Gray had given any attention to the publications dealing
with the subject matter of the book during the six years that intervened betveen
the date of its publication and his death. The new edition contains some trans-
lations, a few additional explanatory notes, some transpositions and additional
citations and adds a useful table of cases. Some topics are transferred from the
appendix to the principal text, appearing as interpolations or as footnotes, the
rather forbidding section numbers are banished, the margins are wider, and the
type is better. On the whole, the second edition is more pleasing to look at than
the first, but the content is the same, with exactly the same merits and defects.
And the merits are many. Barring the first brief chapter on Legal Rights and
Duties, which is not well done, and the author's laborious defense of his untenable
thesis that statute law, like every other kind of law, is made by the courts, the
book is not .only profitable to the reader but highly entertaining as well. One
wishes he might say the same of more of what we are pleased to call "the litera-
ture of the law l" Not only does it exhibit the sound sense, profound learning
and clearness of presentment so characteristic of all of Professor Gray's writing,
but here we find those touches of unexpected humor, those whimsically homely
illustrations, that illuminated his treatment of the profoundest topics in the intim-
acy of the classroom. Thus he admits that analytic jurisprudence may, on its
constructive side, be unfruitful, "but there is no better method for the puncture
of windbags." In announcing his thesis that the "Law of The State or of any
organized body of men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the
judicial organs of that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and
duties," he quizzically notes the absurdity of saying "that the Law of a great nation
means the opinions of half a dozen old gentlemen, conceivably of very limited
intelligence." So, in speaking of the amazing number of civilian treatises on
possession, after noting that Ihering had added a ninth to the previously discovered
eight reasons for protecting possession, he adds: "Whether it is better to protect
possession with nine inconsistent theories, or without any theory at all, is a question
not to be answered offhand in favor of the civilian position."
The author will probably find few readers that will follow him so far as to
accept his contention that a lawfully enacted statute is not law until enforced by
the courts, but most of them will give him the decision in his wordy combat with
the late learned' Professor IV. G. Hammond (in his edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries) and Mr. James C. Carter (in Law, its Origin, Growth and Func-
tion), both of whom contended that the courts do not make the law, but only
discover it in its natural state in some supernal realm and declare it to earth-
treading mortals. The author's treatment of the concept of the state, and sover-
eignty within the state, is notably lacking in that precision and clarity that usually
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characterize his thinking and writing. At one time (p. 82) the state seems to
mean to him the whole body of the nation as a personified unit greatly desiring
that each member should 'Wash himself daily, but regretfully refraining from such
a requirement because it would be too much trouble to compel -such ablutions.
Again (pp. 69, 7o) it appears a figment of the imagination for which heroes may
find it sweet to die, while at another place (p. 69) he regards it as a sort of mask
behind which the "real rulers" of society may hide while they subject the
unconscious citizenry to their will. So far as one can determine from the text;
these "real rulers" are not kings, presidents, governors, or even senators, but the
political bosses, sometimes in petticoats. Sovereignty, if there is any such thing,
appears to reside in these same shadowy rulers, who not only create the state,
but create and control the courts as well (pp. 7o, 122, 123).
But it is in the initial chapter on legal rights and duties that Professor Gray
shows most clearly that jurisprudence was but an incidental diversion to America's
greatest authority on the law of real estate. The distinction between the several
legal relations which the late Professor Hohfeld so convincingly defined under
the terms rights, powers, privileges, and imiunities with their -respective
correlatives, the author never clearly perceived. Following the continental
jurists he recognizes that legal rights and duties are mutually correlatives.
He then declares it is impossible for a right to exist without its correlative
duty, yet curiously enough, he states that there are many duties that get
along very well without any correlative rights to support them. These
are the fabled "self-regardant" duties of the jurists-a sort of solo duties which
do not involve any relation whatever to other persons. The distinguished author's
confusion of thought is shown amusingly in the following passage, in which he is
discussing these strange duties so sadly divorced from their correlative rights:
"There may be a duty to do an act to a person where we cannot say that he has
a right to have the act done. Thus, it may be the duty of Jack Ketch to hang
Jonathan Wild, but we do not say that Wild has a right to be hanged." Hohfeld
would say that Jack Ketch owed a duty to the High Sheriff of London to execute
the death warrant, and that the 'High Sheriff had a correlative right that Jack
should execute it; and that what the unfortunate Jonathan Wild has is a painful
liability, correlative to Jack's legal power to hang him. So the author often uses.
the term right when he means privilege (for example, to eat shrimp salad, or to
set up the statute of limitations in an action) or immunity (for example, under
exemption laws) and naturally finds difficulty in discovering the correlative
duties.
But however philosophers may quarrel over concepts and their names, there is
no gainsaying that this is a delightful book, both entertaining and stimulating.
WIU-IAm R. VANCE.
Yale University School of Law.
Conflict of Laws. By John P. Tiernan. Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1921. pp. vii.
122.
This work purports to deal with the following subjects in the Conflict of Laws:
Comity, Torts, Death Action, Contracts, Remedies, Interest and Usury, Sales
and Chattel Mortgages, Marriage, Legitimation and Adoption, Wills, Crimes, and
Penal Actions, but contains only the fundamental rule and exception governing each
topic, and one or two cases by way of illustration. The book is too elementary to
be of real use.
E. G. LORENZEN.
Yale University School of Law.
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